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When Parents and Clinicians Disagree
Most decisions made by parents on behalf of their
children are benign and without controversy. One
area in which real and potential conflicts between
parental autonomy and the interests of children are
exposed, with unsettling frequency, is in the realm
of contested medical consent cases. 
A parent who has ‘parental responsibility’ under the
Children Act 1989 may consent to medical
treatment on behalf of that child, where the child
lacks Gillick1 competence. The exercise of this
parental autonomy is governed by the best interests
test; parental choice must then be exercised in
accordance with this test and parental decisions
inconsistent with this principle are at risk of legal
challenge. 
In circumstances where parents withhold their
consent to treatment, which is deemed by doctors
to be in the child’s best interests; approval can be
sought from the courts. The court’s power to
authorise the medical treatment of children derives
from its inherent jurisdiction, wardship and more
recently from statute. 
The issue of contested medical treatment was
addressed again in July 2007 in NHS Trust v. A. This
case is unusual because despite the very grave
consequences for the child if she did not undergo
the recommended treatment, no positive order was
sought to compel the parents to take their child to
hospital for treatment and no suggestion was made
in the instant case that she should be taken from
them to facilitate this. Holman J preferred instead to
rely on indications by the parents of their respect
for the ‘inherent objectivity and wisdom of the
court’. In selecting the path of least resistance,
Holman J perhaps sought to repair the damaged
relationship of trust between the parents and
clinicians.
The facts
The Trust in this case sought a declaration to the
effect that it would be lawful for doctors to perform
a bone marrow transplant (BMT) on the seven-
month-old child suffering from a terminal genetic
defect. The proposed treatment, whilst potentially
offering a cure for the child, would be prolonged,
painful and distressing and carried with it significant
risks. A’s parents contended that she should enjoy
the quality of life that she had remaining to her and
withheld their consent to the treatment. 
The parents in this case were well educated,
practicing Christians with a detailed grasp of the
medical issues surrounding their child’s condition
and treatment. Their approach to A’s illness and
prognosis was reasoned and analytical and both
parents had co-operated fully with the medical
advice and treatment up until the point of the
instant case. A’s parents accepted as medically
certain that their child would die without the BMT,
however their strong religious convictions were
manifested in a belief that God has the ability to
heal their child and a fervent hope that this would
be the case.
Unlike most contested medical consent cases the
child in this case was well and in remission.
Crucially, she was living at home with her family in a
loving and caring environment at the time of the
application. Regrettably, by this point A had already
endured a period of serious illness in hospital,
where she had received protracted and damaging
treatment, during which she was in obvious pain
and distress. 
There was no dispute in this case as to the medical
evidence, thus it was medically certain (as
acknowledged by the parents), that without a BMT, A
would die within a year. If a BMT was to be carried
out, it was crucial that it was undertaken whilst A
remained well and before the disease became
active again. 
In the circumstances of this case, the doctors
estimated that the BMT had a 50 per cent chance
of effecting a lasting cure, so that A would enjoy a
normal life expectancy. There remained, however, a
10 per cent prospect that she would die during and
as a direct result of the treatment; a 30 per cent
chance that the treatment would not be successful
and she would die from her underlying HLH; and a
10 per cent prospect that although she may survive
the treatment it would cause some significant
impairment. In the event of a successful BMT, it
was highly probable that 
A would be left infertile. 
Holman J concluded that the religious views of the
parents were not to be taken into consideration, as
an objective balancing of A’s best interests was not
affected by whether her parents adhered to one
particular belief or another. The case was decided
on the basis of medical knowledge, the evidence,
and reason. The central principle in this case was,
with all the relevant factors considered, what was in
the objective best interests of the child? In granting
the application by the Trust, Holman J held that a 50
per cent prospect of a full and normal life (albeit an
infertile one) when set against the certainty of death
outweighed all other considerations and
disadvantages. 
Comment
It is now settled law that parents do not have a right
to demand specific medical treatment for their
child. Following the decision in Re T2 however,
judicial strength was given to the argument that
scope exists for a ‘genuine difference of opinion
between the judge and parents, enabling parents to
legitimately refuse treatment on behalf of their child
in circumstances where the decision is not founded
in ‘scruple or dogma’. Re T was refreshing not
simply because of the courts willingness to look
beyond the medical evidence, which unanimously
concluded that the treatment was in the child’s best
interests; but additionally because of its
consideration of ‘broader considerations’ as
important determinants in the best interests test.
NHS v. A is instructive because it does not appear to
be a case in which such ‘genuine scope’ existed
and in which the ‘broader considerations’ were
clearly not as compelling. In the light of this
decision, it would seem that the decision in Re T is
truly exceptional. 
In our society, with its unprecedented life
expectancy, we tend to deny death all together and
instead celebrate new forms of medical technology
designed to forestall death. In this context it is
perhaps unsurprising that the decision in NHS Trust
v. A, eschewed overt deference to parental know-
how; and of course candour towards death and the
limitations of modern medicine.
Yet in practical terms Holman J’s judgement
maintained that it is the parents of A, who retain
ultimate control over whether or not their child
undergoes the BMT. Of course a cynic would
comment that this power or choice is illusionary in
nature, given the legal armoury poised in the wings,
in the event that A’s parents decline to ‘respect the
inherent wisdom and objectivity of the court’.  n
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